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On the Commitment Capacity of
Unfair Noisy Channels
Claude Cre´peau, Rafael Dowsley and Anderson C. A. Nascimento
Abstract—Noisy channels are a valuable resource from a
cryptographic point of view. They can be used for exchanging
secret-keys as well as realizing other cryptographic primitives
such as commitment and oblivious transfer. To be really useful,
noisy channels have to be consider in the scenario where a
cheating party has some degree of control over the channel
characteristics. Damga˚rd et al. (EUROCRYPT 1999) proposed
a more realistic model where such level of control is permited to
an adversary, the so called unfair noisy channels, and proved
that they can be used to obtain commitment and oblivious
transfer protocols. Given that noisy channels are a precious
resource for cryptographic purposes, one important question is
determining the optimal rate in which they can be used. The
commitment capacity has already been determined for the cases
of discrete memoryless channels and Gaussian channels. In this
work we address the problem of determining the commitment
capacity of unfair noisy channels. We compute a single-letter
characterization of the commitment capacity of unfair noisy
channels. In the case where an adversary has no control over the
channel (the fair case) our capacity reduces to the well-known
capacity of a discrete memoryless binary symmetric channel.
Index Terms—Commitment capacity, unconditionally secure
cryptography, unfair noisy channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
Commitment protocols. Consider the case of first-price
sealed-bid auctions: the participants place their bids in sealed
envelopes that are later on opened to determine the winner and
how much he will pay. The sealed envelopes play a crucial
role in this protocol since they protect the secrecy of each bid
during the bidding process but at the same time they preclude
the winner from changing his bid after the first phase. In the
digital world, commitment protocols have a role similar to
that of the sealed envelopes. They are cryptographic protocols
involving two mutually distrustful parties, Alice and Bob. The
idea of the protocol is very simple: in a first phase Alice
commits to a value c by sending some information to Bob
which commits her to c without revealing it. Later on, Alice
can execute with Bob a second phase of the protocol in order
to reveal the value c. From Alice’s point of view the protocol
should guarantee that after the first phase no information about
c is leaked to Bob. From Bob’s point of view the protocol
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should guarantee that Alice cannot change her mind after the
first phase, i.e., there is at most one value that Alice can
successfully open in an eventual execution of the second phase.
Commitment was introduced by Blum [1] and is one of
the most fundamental cryptographic protocols, widely used
as sub-protocol in applications such as secure multi-party
computation [2], [3], [4], contract signing [5] and zero-
knowledge proofs [6], [7], [8]. In this work we are interested
in commitment protocols that are information-theoretically
secure, i.e., both security guarantees should hold even against
(computationally) unbounded adversaries.
Noise-based cryptography. The potential of noisy channels
for cryptographic purposes was first noticed by Wyner [9] who
proposed a scheme for exchanging a secret-key in the presence
of an eavesdropper (henceforth denote Eve). Wyner considered
a model in which Eve receives the transmitted symbols over
a degraded channel with respect to the legitimate receiver’s
channel. This possibility result was later extended to the class
of general (non-degraded) broadcast channels by Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner [10]. Both models did not consider public commu-
nication. Maurer [11] proved that public communication can
improve the parties’ ability of generating a secret. Ahlswede
and Csisza´r [12] also improved the previous results.
In the case of commitment protocols, the first solution based
on noisy channels was developed by Cre´peau and Kilian [13].
The efficiency of the commitment protocols based on noisy
channels was later improved by Cre´peau [14].
In all these pioneering works, the case where an adversary
can control the characteristics of the channel was not consid-
ered.
Unfair noisy channels. Damga˚rd et al. [15] proposed a
more realistic model, called unfair noisy channels (UNC), in
which the error probability of the channel is not exactly known
by the protocol participants and can be influenced by malicious
parties. The honest parties only know that the crossover
probability is between γ and δ (for 0 < γ < δ < 1/2), and
an adversary can set the crossover probability to any value in
this range. Damga˚rd et al. [15] proved that using UNC with
certain parameters it is possible to implement an information-
theoretically secure commitment protocol.
Recently a variant of UNC known as elastic channel has
been studied. On one hand, it has two restrictions with relation
to UNC: (1) only a corrupt receiver can manipulate the
crossover probability to any value in the range [γ; δ]; (2) when
both parties are honest the crossover probability is always δ.
On the other hand, commitment (and even oblivious transfer)
can be obtained for all parameters 0 < γ < δ < 1/2 [16],
[17].
2Commitment capacity. Since noisy channels are valuable
resources for cryptography, an important question is determin-
ing the optimal rate in which they can be used to implement the
diverse cryptographic primitives. In the case of commitment
this amounts to determining the optimal ratio between the
length of the committed values and the number of uses of the
noisy channel (i.e., the commitment capacity of the channel).
This problem was first raised by Winter et al. [18], who also
answered the question for the case of discrete memoryless
channels. After that, the commitment capacity of Gaussian
channels was obtained by Nascimento et al. [19]. The question
of determining the optimal way of using noisy channels was
also studied for other cryptographic tasks, for instance in the
vast literature on secrecy capacity [9], [10], [20], [21], [11],
[12], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31],
[32], [33] and also in the works that deal with the oblivious
transfer capacity [34], [35], [36], [37], [38].
Our contribution in this work is determining the commit-
ment capacity of unfair noisy channels. The work is organized
as follows. In section II we establish our notation and present
some existing results that will be used thereafter. In section III,
we introduce the model and the security definitions, and also
state our main theorem. In section IV we prove the direct part
of the theorem and in section V the converse. We finish with
some concluding remarks in section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
We will denote by calligraphic letters the domains of ran-
dom variables, by upper case letters the random variables and
by lower case letters the realizations of the random variables.
Other sets are also denoted by calligraphic letters and the
cardinality of a set X is denoted by |X |. For a random
variable X over X , we denote its probability distribution
by PX : X → [0, 1] with
∑
x∈X PX(x) = 1. For a
joint probability distribution PXY : X × Y → [0, 1], let
PX(x) :=
∑
y∈Y PXY (x, y) denote the marginal probability
distribution and let PX|Y (x|y) :=
PXY (x,y)
PY (y)
denote the condi-
tional probability distribution if PY (y) 6= 0. We write Un for
a random variable uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n.
If an algorithm (or a function) f is randomized, we denote
by f(x; r) the result of computing f on input x with random-
ness r. If a and b are two strings of bits of the same length,
we denote by a⊕ b their bitwise XOR and by HD(a, b) their
Hamming distance. The logarithm used in this paper are in
base 2.
B. Entropies
The binary entropy function of x is denoted by h(x) :=
−x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x). For finite alphabets X ,Y,Z
and random variables X ∈ X , Y ∈ Y, Z ∈ Z , the entropy of
X is denoted by H(X) and the mutual information between
X and Y by I(X ;Y ). The min-entropy is given by
H∞(X) = min
x
log(1/PX(x)).
Its conditional version is defined as
H∞(X |Y ) = min
y
H∞(X |Y = y).
The max-entropy is defined as
H0(X) = log |{x ∈ X |PX(x) > 0}|
and its conditional version is given by
H0(X |Y ) = max
y
H0(X |Y = y).
The statistical distance between two probability distributions
PX and PY over the same domain V is
SD (PX , PY ) :=
1
2
∑
v∈V
|PX(v)− PY (v)|.
For 0 ≤ ε < 1 the ε-smooth versions of the above entropies
are defined as
Hε∞(X) = max
X′:SD(P
X′
,PX )≤ε
H∞(X
′),
Hε∞(X |Y ) = max
X′Y ′:SD(P
X′Y ′
,PXY )≤ε
H∞(X
′|Y ′),
Hε0(X) = min
X′:SD(P
X′
,PX)≤ε
H0(X
′),
Hε0(X |Y ) = min
X′Y ′:SD(P
X′Y ′
,PXY )≤ε
H0(X
′|Y ′).
We will need the chain rules for smooth entropies condi-
tioned on an additional random variable Z [39]:
Hε+ε
′
∞ (XY |Z)−H
ε′
∞(Y |Z) ≥ H
ε
∞(X |Y Z)
≥ Hε1∞(XY |Z)−H
ε2
0 (Y |Z)− log(1/(ε− ε1 − ε2))
and
Hε+ε
′
0 (XY |Z)−H
ε′
0 (Y |Z) ≤ H
ε
0(X |Y Z)
≤ Hε10 (XY |Z)−H
ε2
∞(Y |Z) + log(1/(ε− ε1 − ε2)).
C. Strong Extractors and the Leftover-Hash Lemma
In the direct part of our proof we will use strong randomness
extractors, therefore we present here the relevant definitions
and properties.
Definition 2.1 (Strong Randomness Extractors [40], [41]):
Let Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ be a probabilistic polynomial time
function which uses r bits of randomness. We say that Ext is
an efficient (n,m, ℓ, ε)−strong extractor if for all probability
distributions PW withW = {0, 1}
n and such that H∞(W ) ≥
m, for random variables R uniformly distributed in the bit-
strings of length r and L uniformly distributed in the bit-
strings of length ℓ, we have that SD
(
PExt(W ;R),R, PL,R
)
≤ ε.
Strong extractors can extract at most ℓ = m− 2 log(ε−1)+
O(1) bits of nearly random bits [42] and this optimal bound
is achieved by universal hash functions [43].
Definition 2.2 (t-Universal Hash Functions): A class G of
functionsA → B is t-universal if, for any distinct x1, . . . , xt ∈
A, when g is chosen uniformly at random from G, the induced
distribution on (g(x1), . . . , g(xt)) is uniform over B
t.
The leftover-hash lemma (similarly the privacy-
amplification lemma) [44], [45], [46], [47], [41] guarantees
3that universal hash functions can be used to extract
ℓ = m− 2 log(ε−1) + 2 nearly random bits.
Lemma 2.3 (Leftover-hash lemma): Assume that a class G
of functions G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ is 2-universal. Then for G
selected uniformly at random from G we have that
SD
(
PG(W ),G, PUℓ,G
)
≤
1
2
√
2−H∞(W )2ℓ.
In particular, universal hash functions are (n,m, ℓ, ε)−strong
extractors whenever ℓ ≤ m− 2 log(ε−1) + 2.
The following lemma by Rompel will be also useful.
Lemma 2.4 ([48]): Suppose t is a positive even integer,
X1, · · · , Xu are t-wise independent random variables taking
values in the range [0, 1], X =
∑u
i=1Xi, µ = E[X ], and
A > 0. Then
Pr [ |X − µ| > A ] < O
((
tµ+ t2
A2
)t/2)
.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Unfair Noisy Channels
Since commitment protocols that are information-
theoretically secure cannot be implemented from scratch,
the efforts were focused on obtaining such protocols based
on physical assumptions. One of these assumptions is
the existence of noisy channels that can be used by the
parties. Binary symmetric channels are known to allow the
implementation of commitment schemes [13], [14]. But
these protocols have the disadvantage that they rely on the
assumption that a malicious party do not interfere with the
channel to try to modify its error probability.
Damga˚rd et al. [15] introduced a more realistic assumption,
namely unfair noisy channels, that is a modification of the
binary symmetric channel. In this model, a channel is specified
by two parameters: γ and δ (with 0 < γ < δ < 12 ); and the
channel is denoted as (γ, δ)-UNC. The error probability of
the channel is guaranteed to fall into the interval [γ, δ], but is
not known by the honest parties. Therefore any protocol based
on a (γ, δ)-UNC should work for any error probability in the
range [γ, δ]. On the other hand, a malicious party can set the
error probability to any value in the range [γ, δ].
Definition 3.1 (Unfair Noisy Channels): The (γ, δ)-UNC
receives as input a bit X and outputs a bit Y . The transition
probability of the (γ, δ)-UNC is determined by an auxiliary
parameter T whose alphabet are the real numbers in the
interval [γ, δ]. If the transmitter or the receiver is malicious, he
can choose the value of T ; otherwise it is randomly chosen and
is not revealed to the parties. The transition probability is given
by PY |XT (y, x, t) = 1− t if y = x and PY |XS(y, x, t) = t if
y 6= x.
Damga˚rd et al. [15] proved that, on one hand, if δ ≥ 2γ(1−
γ) then the (γ, δ)-UNC is trivial (i.e., secure commitment
protocols cannot be based on this channel). On the other hand,
if δ < 2γ(1 − γ) then there is a commitment protocol based
on the (γ, δ)-UNC.
Remark: Note that a (γ, δ)-UNC can equivalently be seen
as the concatenation of two binary symmetric channels, Wf
with error probability γ and Wv with error probability θ for
0 ≤ θ ≤ δ−γ1−2γ . The error probability of the channel Wv can
be controlled by a malicious party and it is unknown in the
case that both parties are honest.
Definition 3.2: We say that two strings xn and yn are
ǫ-compatible with an (γ, δ)-Unfair Noisy Channel if, for
ǫ > 0, the Hamming distance (HD) of xn and yn is at
most δn+ ǫ. Similarly, two random variables Xn and Y n are
said to be compatible with an (γ, δ)-Unfair Noisy Channel if
Pr [HD(Xn, Y n) > δn ] is negligible in n.
B. Commitment Capacity
Since (γ, δ)-UNC are valuable resources, one would like
to use them in the most efficient way. Hence the important
question of determining the commitment capacity of these
channels arises. Our goal in this work is to determine the
commitment capacity of unfair noisy channels in the same way
that Winter et al. [18] did for the discrete memoryless channels
and Nascimento et al. [19] did for the Gaussian channels. Let
us begin by defining the concept of commitment protocols and
recalling its security notions.
A commitment protocol has two phases: called commitment
and opening. There are two parties involved in the protocol: the
committer (also denoted Alice) and the verifier (also denoted
Bob). The protocol works as follows. In the commitment
phase, Alice commits to a value c, but without revealing
anything about it to Bob. Later on, Alice can execute the
opening phase to disclose the value c to Bob. The security
guarantee that Alice expects from the protocol is that nothing
about c should be learned by Bob in the first phase, while the
security guarantee that Bob expects is that Alice should not be
able to change the value committed to after the first phase. We
proceed with a more detailed description of these definitions
and of the resources available to the parties in our model.
Alice and Bob have two channels available between them:
− a bidirectional authenticated noiseless channel, and
− (γ, δ)-UNC from Alice to Bob
Note that this model allows multiple uses of the (γ, δ)-UNC
within a protocol in an interactive manner. Let n denote the
number of times that the parties use the (γ, δ)-UNC channel.
a) Commitment Protocol: A commitment protocol is a
family of protocols indexed by the security parameter n.
Each protocol uses the (γ, δ)-UNC n times and proceeds in
two phases as described below. For the sake of simplicity in
the notation we will not explicitly mention the dependence
on the security parameter. Both parties have access to local
randomness. Note that all the messages generated by Alice and
Bob are well-defined random variables, depending on the value
that Alice wants to commit to, c, and the local randomness of
the parties. As usual, we assume that the noiseless messages
exchanged by the players and their personal randomness are
taken from {0, 1}∗.
b) Commitment Phase: Alice has an input c (from the
message space C) that she wants to commit to. There are n
rounds of communication through the (γ, δ)-UNC and in each
of these rounds Alice inputs a symbol xi to the (γ, δ)-UNC
and an output yi is delivered to Bob. Let X
n be the random
variable denoting the bitstring sent through the (γ, δ)-UNC
4and Y n the bitstring received through the (γ, δ)-UNC. The
parties can use the bidirectional authenticated noiseless chan-
nel at any time, with the messages possibly depending on Xn,
C and the local randomness. Let M be the random variable
denoting all the noiseless messages exchanged between the
players,
c) Opening Phase: The parties only exchange messages
over the noiseless channel. Alice announces the value cˆ and
the bitstring xˆn that she claims that she used during the first
phase. Finally Bob executes a test β(xˆn, yn,m, cˆ) in order to
decide if he accepts the value cˆ or not.
We call Bob’s view all the data in his possession after the
completion of the commitment phase and denote it by viewB .
A commitment protocol is ǫ-sound if for honest Alice and
Bob executing the protocol and for all c ∈ C and for any Xn
compatible with Y n for the (γ, δ)-UNC,
Pr [β(Xn, Y n,M, c) = accept ] ≥ 1− ǫ.
A commitment protocol is ǫ-concealing if for any possible
behavior of Bob in the commitment phase,
I(C;V iewB) ≤ ǫ.
A protocol is ǫ-binding, if for all c˜, c ∈ C such that c˜ 6= c
and for any strategy of (a dishonest) Alice to pick the random
variable Xn that is sent through the (γ, δ)-UNC channel, and
the random variables X˜n and X
n
that are presented during
the opening phase
Pr
[
β(X˜n, Y n,M, c˜) = accept &
β(X
n
, Y n,M, c) = accept
]
≤ ǫ.
We call a commitment protocol secure if there exists a
function ǫ that is negligible in the security parameter n and is
such that the protocol is ǫ-sound, ǫ-concealing and ǫ-binding.1
Remark:We restrict our model to protocols where the public
conversation M does not depend on the channel output Y n
given Xn, that is I(M ;Y n|Xn) = 0. This is indeed the case
for all the protocols in the literature. Moreover, the public
communication is used solely to prevent Alice from cheating,
thus we see no reason for a commitment protocol based on
noisy channels to have its public communication depending
on the channel output for a given input Xn.
The commitment rate of the protocol is given by
RC =
log |C|
n
.
A commitment rate is said to be achievable if there exists
a secure commitment protocol that achieves this rate. The
commitment capacity of a (γ, δ)-UNC is the supremum of the
achievable rates.
Our main result is presented below and states the com-
mitment capacity of the (γ, δ)-UNC. The proof appears in
sections IV and V.
1For easy of presentation the security of the constructions is argued in
the stand-alone model (as usual in cryptography) in which case there is only
one execution of the protocol. But the security of the commitment protocols
based on noisy channels can be extended to the UC framework [49] in which
the protocols can be composed and arbitrary protocols can be executed in
parallel [50], [51].
Theorem 3.3: The commitment capacity of any non-trivial
(γ, δ)-Unfair Noisy Channel is given by
h(γ)− h(θ), for θ =
δ − γ
1− 2γ
.
IV. PROTOCOL - DIRECT PART
We first prove the direct part of the theorem, i.e., we
describe the protocol that achieves the commitment capacity
and prove its security. The protocol follows the approach of
Damga˚rd et al. [15] and uses two rounds of hash challenge-
response in order to guarantee the binding property: the
intuition is that the first round reduces the number of inputs
that Alice can successfully open to be polynomial in the
security parameter. The second round then binds Alice to one
specific input. The concealing condition is achieved using a
2-universal hash function Ext chosen by Alice that is used to
generate a secure key which is then applied as a one-time pad
to cipher c.
Let θ = δ−γ1−2γ and let ν > 0 be a parameter of the protocol.
Let α1, α2, β be parameters such that α1, α2 > 0, β > α1 +
α2, and n(h(θ)+α1), nα2 and n(h(γ)−h(θ)−β) are integers.
In the following commitment protocol the message space is
C = {0, 1}n(h(γ)−h(θ)−β).
Commitment Phase: Alice wants to commit to the binary
string c ∈ C. The parties proceed as follows:
1) Alice chooses a random binary string xn = (x1, . . . , xn)
of dimension n and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n sends the bit xi to
Bob over the (γ, δ)-UNC.
2) Bob receives the string yn = (y1, . . . , yn) sent over the
(γ, δ)-UNC, chooses uniformly at random a function
g1 of the class of 4n-universal hash functions G1 :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n(h(θ)+α1), and sends the description
of g1 to Alice over the noiseless channel.
3) Alice computes e1 = g1(x
n) and sends it to Bob.
4) Bob chooses uniformly at random a function g2 of the
class of 2-universal hash functions G2 : {0, 1}
n →
{0, 1}nα2 , and sends its description to Alice over the
noiseless channel.
5) Alice chooses uniformly at random a function Ext :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n(h(γ)−h(θ)−β) of the class of two-
universal hash functions, computes d = c ⊕ Ext(xn)
and e2 = g2(x
n), and sends d, e2 and the description of
Ext to Bob over the noiseless channel.
Opening Phase: Alice wants to reveal the value of c to Bob.
The parties proceeds as follow:
1) Alice sends to Bob over the noiseless channel the values
xn and c.
2) Bob checks if γn − νn ≤ HD(xn, yn) ≤ δn + νn, if
g1(x
n) = e1, g2(x
n) = e2 and if c = Ext(x
n)⊕ d. Bob
accepts if there are no problems in the tests.
Theorem 4.1: The protocol is secure and can achieve the
commitment rate h(γ)−h(θ)−β for any h(γ)−h(θ) > β > 0
and n sufficiently large.
Proof: We proof that the protocol is binding, concealing and
sound, and furthermore achieves the desired commitment rate.
5a) Soundness: The protocol fails for honest Alice and Bob
only if HD(xn, yn) > δn + νn or HD(xn, yn) < γn − νn.
We have that the expectation of HD(xn, yn) is less than or
equal to δn, because the (γ, δ)-UNC has error probability less
than or equal to δ. So the Chernoff bound guarantees that
the probability that HD(xn, yn) > δn + νn is a negligible
function of n. Similarly we can prove that the probability that
HD(xn, yn) < γn− νn is a negligible function of n.
b) Concealment: For any η > 0 and n sufficiently large, we
have that
Hε∞(X
n|G1(X
n), G2(X
n), Y n, G1, G2) ≥
≥ H∞(X
n, G1(X
n), G2(X
n)|Y n, G1, G2)
−H0(G1(X
n), G2(X
n)|Y n, G1, G2)− log(ε
−1)
= H∞(X
n|Y n, G1, G2)
−H0(G1(X
n), G2(X
n)|Y n, G1, G2)− log(ε
−1)
= H∞(X
n|Y n)
−H0(G1(X
n), G2(X
n)|Y n, G1, G2)− log(ε
−1)
≥ n(h(γ)− η)− n(h(θ) + α1 + α2)− log(ε
−1)
= n(h(γ)− h(θ)− η − α1 − α2)− log(ε
−1)
where the first inequality follows from the chain rule
for smooth entropy, the first equality from the fact that
G1(X
n), G2(X
n) are functions ofG1, G2 andX
n, the second
equality from the fact that Xn is independent of G1, G2 given
Y n and the last inequality follows from the facts that the error
probability of the channel is at least γ, the range of G1 has
cardinality 2n(h(θ)+α1) and the range of G2 has cardinality
2nα2 .
Setting ε = 2−κn (with κ > 0), for n sufficiently large, the
security of the key obtained by applying the hash function
Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n(h(γ)−h(θ)−β) to x follows from
the leftover-hash lemma since β > α1 + α2 and κ and η
can be arbitrarily small for n sufficiently large. Note that
having a negligible statistical distance is equivalent to having
a negligible mutual information [52].
c) Binding: A dishonest Alice can cheat successfully only if
she finds two different strings xn and x˜n such that γn−νn ≤
HD(xn, yn) ≤ δn + νn, γn − νn ≤ HD(x˜n, yn) ≤ δn +
νn, and both pass the sequentially performed hash challenge-
response tests, for arbitrarily small ν and sufficiently large n.
We can assume without loss of generality that Alice sets the
error probability of the channel to γ when she sends xn. In the
typicality test an honest Bob accepts any string that is jointly
typical with yn for any error probability γ ≤ ρ ≤ δ. So Alice
can cheat only if she finds two strings xn and x˜n so that both
pass the hash tests and are jointly typical with xn for binary
symmetric channels with error probabilities 0 ≤ τ ≤ θ and
0 ≤ τ˜ ≤ θ. The number of such jointly typical strings is upper
bounded by 2n(h(θ)+ε
′) for any ε′ > 0 and n sufficiently large.
We fix α1 > ε
′.
Let the viable set denote the channel inputs that Alice can
possibly open to Bob and he would accept. If there were no
hash checks, the viable set would have at most 2n(h(θ)+ε
′)
elements. Lets consider this initial viable set. The goal of the
first round of hash challenge-response is to, with overwhelm-
ing probability, reduce the number of elements of the viable
set to at most 8n+1. In this first round, Alice has to commit
to one arbitrary value e1 for the output of the hash function
g1. Considering the j-th viable string before this first round,
we define Ij as 1 if that string is mapped to e1 by g1; and
Ij = 0 otherwise. Let I =
∑
j Ij . Clearly µ = E[I] < 1 as
α1 > ε
′. Let e1 be considered bad if I is bigger than 8n+ 1.
Given that g1 is 4n-wise independent, by applying Lemma 2.4
with t = 4n and A = 2t = 8n, we get
Pr [ I > 8n+ 1 ] < O
((
tµ+ t2
(2t)2
)t/2)
< O
((
1 + t
4t
)t/2)
< O
(
2−t/2
)
.
Then the probability that any e1 is bad is upper bounded by
O
(
2n(h(θ)+α1)2−t/2
)
< O
(
2−n
)
.
But if the viable set contains at most 8n+1 elements after the
first hash challenge-response round, the probability that some
of those collide in the second hash challenge-response round
is upper bounded by
(8n+ 1)
2
2−α2n,
which is negligible in n.
d) Commitment Rate: For n sufficiently large, α1 and α2
can be made arbitrarily small, and thus β can also be made
arbitrarily small while preserving the security of the proto-
col. Therefore it is possible to achieve the commitment rate
h(γ)− h(θ)− β for any h(γ)− h(θ) > β > 0.
V. CONVERSE
For proving the converse, we will assume a specific cheating
behavior for Alice. As we are interested in proving an upper
bound in the commitment capacity, restricting Alice’s behavior
will only strength our result. Let k = log |C| and C be
uniformly random over C. Let Xn be a random variable
representing the data Alice inputs into the unfair noisy channel.
Assume, Alice sets the noise level of the unfair noisy channel
connecting her to Bob to γ. Let Y n be a random variable
obtained by passing Xn through the unfair noisy channel
(Channel 1). Let Zn be a random variable obtained by passing
Xn through a binary symmetric channel with error probability
equal to θ with 0 ≤ θ ≤ δ−γ1−2γ (Channel 2). Denote
the conversation over the public authenticated and noiseless
channel by M .
In the case of commitments based on fair noisy channels, it
was proved in [18] that after the commit phase is finished, if
Bob is presented with Alice’s inputs to the channel, Xn, he is
able to obtain almost complete knowledge on the committed
6value C. Here we will prove that in the case of unfair noisy
channels if Bob is presented with a noisy version of Xn he
is still able to compute the committed value C with high
probability.
Lemma 5.1: H(C|ZnM) ≤ 1 + kp for p negligible in n.
Proof: Let C,Xn, Y n, Zn and M be defined as above. We
first give a procedure so that the commitment C can be
estimated with high probability from Zn, Y n and M .
The procedure is as follows: given Zn, Y n and M , compute
the value c that maximizes Pr [β(Zn, Y n,M, c) = accept ],
breaking ties in an arbitrary way. Because of the bindingness
condition, we know that no two different values of c will be
accepted with high probability
Pr
[
β(X˜n, Y n,M, c˜) = accept &
β(X
n
, Y n,M, c) = accept
]
≤ ǫ
for all X˜n and X
n
compatible with Y n.
Moreover, from the correctness property of the protocol and
from the fact that Zn and Y n are compatible for the unfair
noisy channel in question, we know that for the correct value
c we have
Pr [β(Zn, Y n,M, c) = accept ] ≥ 1− ǫ.
Thus, with high probability this procedure will give us the
right committed value c. Let p be the probability that this
procedure returns a wrong value. Using Fano’s inequality we
get
H(C|ZnY nM) ≤ h(p) + p log |C|
≤ 1 + p log |C|
≤ 1 + kp.
One can prove that the output of the channel Y n is not
needed in the above described procedure. The intuition is that
Zn is a “less noisy” version of Xn and thus can be used
(instead of Y n) for retrieving the value of the commitment. In
order to formalize this result, we need to use the assumed
independence of the public conversation M and Y n given
Xn, i.e., I(M ;Y n|Xn) = 0. First, we pass (or simulate the
passing of) Zn through a binary symmetric channel with error
probability γ. Denote the output of the simulated channel by
Y˜ n. Note that Y˜ n andXn are compatible. Moreover, given the
fact that the public conversation is independent of Y n given
Xn, we have that the public communication of the protocol
using Channel 1 (M ), C,Xn and Y˜ n are a valid transcript of a
commitment protocol (the correctness, binding and concealing
properties should apply). Thus, one has from the correctness
property that
Pr
[
β(Zn, Y˜ n,M, c) = accept
]
≥ 1− ǫ.
From bindingness we have that
Pr
[
β(X˜n, Y˜ n,M, c˜) = accept &
β(X
n
, Y˜ n,M, c) = accept
]
≤ ǫ
for all X˜n and X
n
compatible with Y˜ n.
Again, using Fano’s inequality we get
H(C|ZnY˜ nM) ≤ h(p) + p log |C|
≤ 1 + p log |C|
≤ 1 + kp.
Because the Markov chain CXn ↔ Zn ↔ Y˜ n holds, we have
that H(C|ZnY˜ nM) = H(C|ZnM), which proves our result.
We have that
k ≤ H(C|Y nM) + ǫ (1)
= H(C|Y nM)−H(C|ZnM) +H(C|ZnM) + ǫ
≤ H(C|Y nM)−H(C|ZnM) + 1 + kp+ ǫ (2)
= H(C|Y nM)−H(C|ZnM)−H(C|M) +H(C|M)
+1 + kp+ ǫ
= I(C;Zn|M)− I(C;Y n|M) + 1 + kp+ ǫ
where inequality 1 comes from the ǫ-concealing requirement
and inequality 2 from the previous lemma.
Now we develop the expression I(C;Zn|M)−I(C;Y n|M)
using the same steps used on the Section V of the seminal work
of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [10]; the details are included for the
sake of completeness. Let Zi denote Z1 . . . Zi and Yˆ
i denote
Yi . . . Yn. We expand I(C;Z
n|M) starting from I(C;Z1|M)
and I(C;Y n|M) starting from I(C;Yn|M)
I(C;Zn|M) =
n∑
i=1
I(C;Zi|MZ
i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Zi|MZ
i−1)−H(Zi|MZ
i−1C)
−H(Zi|MZ
i−1CYˆ i+1)
+H(Zi|MZ
i−1CYˆ i+1)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(CYˆ i+1;Zi|MZ
i−1)
−I(Yˆ i+1;Zi|MZ
i−1C)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(C;Zi|MZ
i−1Yˆ i+1)
+I(Yˆ i+1;Zi|MZ
i−1)
−I(Yˆ i+1;Zi|MZ
i−1C)
]
.
7Similarly we obtain
I(C;Y n|M) =
n∑
i=1
[
I(C;Yi|MZ
i−1Yˆ i+1)
+I(Zi−1;Yi|MYˆ
i+1)
−I(Zi−1;Yi|MYˆ
i+1C)
]
.
We have that
n∑
i=1
I(Yˆ i+1;Zi|MZ
i−1) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
I(Yj ;Zi|MZ
i−1Yˆ j+1)
=
n∑
j=2
j−1∑
i=1
I(Yj ;Zi|MZ
i−1Yˆ j+1)
=
n∑
j=1
I(Zj−1;Yj |MYˆ
j+1).
Similarly we can get that
n∑
i=1
I(Yˆ i+1;Zi|MZ
i−1C) =
n∑
j=1
I(Zj−1;Yj |MYˆ
j+1C).
Therefore
I(C;Zn|M)− I(C;Y n|M) =
n∑
i=1
[
I(C;Zi|MZ
i−1Yˆ i+1)
−I(C;Yi|MZ
i−1Yˆ i+1)
]
.
Letting L be a random variable uniformly distributed in
{1, . . . , n} and independent of CMXnY nZn, and setting
U , MZL−1Yˆ L+1L, V , UC, X , XL, Y , YL and
Z , ZL we get that U ↔ V ↔ X ↔ Y Z form a Markov
chain and
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(C;Zi|MZ
i−1Yˆ i+1)− I(C;Yi|MZ
i−1Yˆ i+1)
]
=
= I(C;Z|U)− I(C;Y |U)
= I(V ;Z|U)− I(V ;Y |U).
Putting everything together, for any secure commitment pro-
tocol, there are U ↔ V ↔ X ↔ Y Z such that
k
n
≤ I(V ;Z|U)− I(V ;Y |U) + ǫ′ (3)
where ǫ′ = 1+kp+ǫn goes to 0 for n sufficiently large.
We now set θ = δ−γ1−2γ . In our case channel 2 is less noisy
than channel 1, therefore maximizing over all U ↔ V ↔
X ↔ Y Z we get
I(V ;Z|U)− I(V ;Y |U) = I(V ;Z)− I(V ;Y )
−[I(U ;Z)− I(U ;Y )]
= I(X ;Z)− I(X ;Y )
−[I(X ;Z|V )− I(X ;Y |V )]
−[I(U ;Z)− I(U ;Y )]
≤ I(X ;Z)− I(X ;Y ) (4)
≤ h(γ)− h(θ) (5)
where inequality 4 comes from the fact that both expressions
in the brackets are non-negative since channel 2 is less noisy
than channel 1 and inequality 5 follows taking the maximum
over X . Hence
k
n
≤ h(γ)− h(θ) + ǫ′
where ǫ′ goes to 0 for n sufficiently large. This completes the
proof of the converse.
VI. FINAL REMARKS
In this paper we obtained the commitment capacity of
the unfair noisy channels. A similar notion of capacity for
oblivious transfer was defined in [34]. We state as an open
problem to obtain the oblivious transfer capacity of unfair
noisy channels. Another open question is to derive the com-
mitment capacity of weak channels [53]. In the case of elastic
channels, for commitments from Alice to Bob, the channel
is essentially degraded to a binary symmetric channel with
crossover probability γ and therefore the commitment capacity
is h(γ). On the other hand, we conjecture that the commitment
capacity for commitments from Bob to Alice is h(δ) − h(θ)
for θ = δ−γ1−2γ . However, if either of the two restrictions of
the elastic channels in relation to unfair noisy channels is
discarded (i.e., only the receiver being able to set the crossover
probability; and the crossover probability being fixed to δ
when both parties are honest), then we get back to the same
commitment capacity as for the unfair noisy channels.
Finally, we need in our proof to assume that
I(M ;Y n|Xn) = 0, that is, the public communication
and the channel outputs are independent given the channel
inputs. While that is a natural condition respected by all
the protocols that exist, we believe that, ultimately, a more
general proof that does not depend on this restriction is
possible. We leave such a proof as a future research problem.
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